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Guest Editorial
What makes the Reasoner such an interest-
ing venue is that the topic – “reasoning”–
is one that crosses tradi-
tional disciplinary bound-
aries. People interested in
reasoning might find them-
selves in university depart-
ments ranging from psychol-
ogy to economics to statistics
to philosophy and beyond.
This is, I think, a blessing
and a curse. A blessing, be-
cause it means that in the-
ory we have at our disposal
a very broad range of tools
with which to investigate the topic. A curse, because there is
a real danger of reasoning researchers in different departments
not talking to each other, or talking past one another.
Our interviewee this month is someone who has spent his ca-
reer moving around across those disciplinary boundaries, trying
to bridge the gaps. Greg and I first met in the spiritual home of
the Reasoner – the University of Kent – at a conference about
a topic of central interest to many readers of the Reasoner: the
foundations of statistics. Several years later we shared an office
in Munich for a while. It was a pleasure to interview Greg, and
to learn about his views on a topic that will, I predict, become
more and more relevant to those of us interested in reasoning in
the coming years: machine learning.
Seamus Bradley
Philosophy, University of Tilburg
Features
Interview with Gregory Wheeler
Seamus Bradley: Hi Greg, thanks for agreeing to be inter-
viewed.
Gregory Wheeler: My pleasure, Seamus. It is always good
to talk to you.
SB: Let’s start with a little background. If I remember cor-
rectly, you worked in engineering in some capacity before turn-
ing to philosophy?
GW: That’s right. I worked for I.B.M. and a spin-off called
StorageTek as a mechanical vibration test engineer. My job
was to simulate earthquakes and military planes landing on re-
mote dirt strips to see whether the hardware we were designing
would survive, But I also diagnosed vibration problems that we
brought on ourselves. My days were spent breaking expensive
prototypes and figuring out why they broke.
SB: And you did your PhD under Henry Kyburg; what was
he like?
GW: Kyburg was a lapsed engineer, too. Chemical. And a
cattle farmer on the side. He and his wife, Sarah, bought a farm
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the same time, this is only one part of AI.
Returning to your question about epistemology. Nobody —
setting aside the singularity fringe — thinks that these recent
advances in machine learning will yield up the judgment and
common-sense reasoning that is currently missing from these
systems. That said, the variety of problems that can be reduced
to a perception problem is staggering, where correct classifi-
cation is enough to achieve desirable goal. I expect that we
will continue to be surprised by the range of problems that will
be cracked by these methods. Correct classification is another
name for finding the truth or making a reliable judgment. What
is surprising is the every-growing domain of problems where
truths can be learned and reliable judgments be made without
much understanding at all. The link between prediction and ex-
planation, which underpins data models in inferential statistics
and Bayesian statistics alike, and pervades epistemology, has
been cut. So much for evidentialism.
Now, to be sure, there are good reasons to restore this con-
nection between prediction and explanation: if you are turned
down for a loan, it is fair to ask for a reason why. Indeed, the
European General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) that
will go into effect next year requires that such an explanation
be made available to algorithmic decisions involving EU citi-
zens. But, the point is that the connection between explanation
and accurate prediction is strictly unnecessary. We have mod-
els that make effective predictions but which are incapable of
yielding an explanation.
SB: Do you think advances in machine learning are going to
change the debate about philosophy of mind?
GW: The steam-engine. Telephone switching centers. The
intuitive statistician. The mainframe computer. All of these
technologies were used as metaphors in psychology. So, per-
haps it is inevitable that as machine learning techniques spread
across society and the sciences, we will see those ideas in-
fluence how we understand ourselves or the world around us.
I saw a conference paper earlier this year that presented a
model and evidence for how neurons in our brains performs
back propagation! What was once a knock-down argument
against artificial neural networks (ANNs) having anything to do
with brain science— ANNs rely on back-propagation; brains
don’t— is now a subject of inquiry in brain science.
There is some very interesting work by Facebook’s AI group
in creating object masks for images, all built on a convolutional
neural network architecture. This system can pick out occluded
or partial objects from a photo and accurately identify them.
So, a photo with a ball, the back of a person’s head, part of a
TV screen, et cetera, can be picked out as individual objects,
masked by a border, and correctly labeled. This is a big leap
beyond classifying an entire photo as one that includes a ball,
a person, a TV, et cetera, which was the state of the art a few
years ago. Yet this capability is precisely the sort of achieve-
ment that a layman may well see and say, “so what?”. A child
could take a marker, trace around objects in a photo, and write
down a correct label. Because people are so good at this task,
it is understandable why we do not realize how difficult it is
for a machine to do this. And that this has been done on top
of an R-CNN architecture is incredible. This is a small step
toward the missing “reasoning” and “representation” that mo-
tivates logical approaches to AI, but these capabilities are from
a “bottom-up” fashion. From the point of view of analytical
philosophy, particularly those branches that remain steeped in
logic and language, the details of this algorithm will appear
completely backwards.
Here is one implication for the philosophy of mind, in broad
strokes. It is not uncommon for philosophers of mind to view
behavior in terms of agency, and to understand agency in terms
of language in general, and ideas about languages from the phi-
losophy of language in particular. Let’s face it, analytic phi-
losophy is rooted in language. But the advent of systems that
begin with effective behavior and work backwards to proto-
representations reverse the implications, throwing into doubt
chains of reasoning that ascribe agency to robots or passive
systems on the basis of purportedly intensional behavior and
misguided ideas of what is mentally necessary to realize such
behavior. Similar to the break between explanation and predic-
tion, the role of language and representation in effective behav-
ior will call for reevaluation. Here again there are good reasons
to tie together language and action. But the presumption there
are intimate and necessary links between language and practi-
cal action, which is a legacy of 20th century analytic philoso-
phy, is challenged by the performance of these systems, and in
any event the last century’s obsession with language will not
suit philosophy for the current century. The reign of language
is over.
News
Logic in the Wild, 9–10 November
The workshop Logic in the Wild was held on November 9th
and 10th in Ghent, Belgium. It was the sixth workshop
in the Logic, Reasoning and Rationality series supported by
the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) through the scien-
tific research network on Logical and Methodological Analy-
sis of Scientific Reasoning Processes. The network brings to-
gether research groups from nine European universities carry-
ing out research on relevant topics: Adam Mickiewicz Uni-
versity Pozna?, Free University of Brussels, Ghent University,
Ruhr-University Bochum, Tilburg University, University Col-
lege London, University of Antwerp, Utrecht University and
VU University Amsterdam. For the duration of the project,
from 2015 till 2019, there are two workshops organized per
year, one in spring and one in autumn.
The workshop was organized by the Centre for Logic and
Philosophy of Science (Ghent University), which coordinates
the activities of the network, and the Department of Logic
and Cognitive Science (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan´,
Poland). Its title, Logic in the Wild, stemmed from Keith Sten-
ning and Michiel van Lambalgen’s seminal book Human Rea-
soning and Cognitive Science (MIT Press, 2008) in which the
authors both advocate for and exemplify the productivity of the
paradigm called a ‘practical’, or cognitive turn in logical re-
search. The approach draws on enormous achievements of a
legion of formal and mathematical logicians, but focuses on
the Wild: actual human processes of reasoning and argumenta-
tion. Moreover, high standards of inquiry that we owe to formal
logicians offer a new quality in research on reasoning and ar-
gumentation. In terms of John Corcoran?s distinction between
logic as formal ontology and logic as formal epistemology, the
aim of the practical turn is to make formal epistemology even
more epistemically oriented. This is not to say that this ?prac-
tically turned? (or cognitively oriented) logic becomes just a
part of psychology. This is to say that this logic aquires a new
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task of “systematically keeping track of changing representa-
tions of information”, as Johan van Benthem puts it, and that
it contests the claim that the distinction between descriptive
and normative accounts of reasoning is disjoint and exhaus-
tive. From a different than purely psychological perspective
logic becomes—again—interested in answering Dewey’s ques-
tion about the Wild: how do we think? This is the new alluring
face of psychologism, or cognitivism, in logic, as opposed to
the old one, which Frege and Husserl fought against. And this
was the area of research to which this workshop was devoted.
The workshop brought together 23 participants who pre-
sented talks on applications of logic to analyses of natural lan-
guage and everyday reasoning phenomena. The keynotes were
delivered by Iris van Rooij (Radboud University), Keith Sten-
ning (University of Edinburgh) and Christian Strasser (Ruhr
University Bochum).
In her talk ‘Cognition in the wild: logic and complexity’
Iris van Rooij addressed the issue of computational intractabil-
ity of models of cognition. Van Rooij’s proposal proposal is
that cognitive science should recognize tractability as a funda-
mental constraint on cognition in the wild. She explained how
the tractability constraint can serve as a formal guide in theory
development and furthermore illustrated how logic-based ap-
proaches may especially benefit from this approach as it may
enlarge their recognized scope and relevance for cognitive sci-
ence.
Keith Stenning started his talk, ‘Memory is the organ of non-
monotonic reasoning’ with a question: Nothing is wilder than
the human mind? He outlined a program of research which
uses Logic Programming (in a particular flavour) as a model
of human semantic memory, in the service of nonmonotonic
reasoning to an interpretation. He claimed that applying LP
to memory will serve as an example of a relation between logic
and the mind, and hopefully motivate some researchers of a log-
ical bent to collaborate with the kind of empirical work which
needs to go on. Stenning warned that there is a great danger, on
both sides of the cognitive/logical fence, of underestimating the
density of the problems which live down this crack. The psy-
chologist who denies the relevance of logic?s ‘normative’ sys-
tems is as numerous as the logician who thinks that his (usually
but not always ‘his’) newly invented logic is straightforwardly
a contribution to how human reasoning works.
Christian Strasser’s talk ‘Reasoning by cases (RbC) in the
nonmonotonic wilderness’ was concerned with is an inference
scheme especially apt for situations in which we deal with in-
complete information. He discussed some challenges for defea-
sible accounts of RbC, highlighted shortcomings of approaches
to RbC from the literature on non-monotonic logic, and pre-
sented a new account of a defeasible variant of RbC based on
formal argumentation.
Rafal Urbaniak
Erik Weber
Ghent University
Mariusz Urban´ski
Adam Mickiewicz University Poznan´
Calls for Papers
Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory and
Epistemology: special issue of Topoi, deadline 31 January.
Decision Theory and the Future of Artificial Intelligence:
special issue of Synthese, deadline 15 February.
Defeasible and Ampliative Reasoning: special issue of Interna-
tional Journal of Approximate Reasoning, deadline 15 Febru-
ary.
Non-Classical Modal and Predicate Logics: special issue of
Logic Journal of the IGPL, deadline 30 April.
What’s Hot in . . .
Mathematical Philosophy
Reviving the present column is a good resolution for 2018.
The plan is that members and friends of the Munich Center
for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) will take turns to write
it.
To kickstart this, I’d like to share some thoughts
about one decision-theoretic issue that has been bug-
ging me recently. The issue arises in Savage’s frame-
work. At first, it looks like a terminological puzzle of
sorts. But it proves to be more substantial than that.
In Savage’s framework,
the options between which
the decision-maker chooses
are acts, i.e., functions from
a set of states to a set of pay-
offs (a.k.a. consequences).
Assume that the name of
the game is the following.
You’re supposed to observe
the decision-maker’s choices
between Savagian acts and,
based on that information, to
identify her beliefs about the likelihood of the states and her
preferences between the payoffs. As is well known, in Savage’s
own take on this identification exercise, the decision-maker’s
beliefs are quantified by a subjective probability function, her
preferences, by a utility function, and her observed choices con-
form to the rule of maximizing subjective expected utility. As is
equally well known, there are many troublesome cases, which
Savage’s work was instrumental in identifying, where such a
model is not applicable.
One such troublesome case seems to be indifferently re-
ferred to as “act-state dependence” or “moral hazard” in most
of the literature. The intuition is as follows. In some cases,
the decision-maker’s beliefs about the likelihood of the states
will, somehow, depend on the Savagian act under considera-
tion—whence “act-state dependence”—and this, in turn, is best
understood with reference to the “moral hazard” cases stud-
ied in economics—i.e., essentially, cases where the decision-
maker’s choices can, somehow, influence the likelihood of the
events of interest. Now, here comes the question to which I
want to draw your attention: Are ”act-state dependence” and
”moral hazard” synonyms in decision theory? I’m not deny-
ing that there are conditions under which they can be treated as
such. I’m asking whether there are not also cases where they
cannot.
It turns out that there are, indeed, cases where act-state de-
pendence and moral hazard come apart. Let me start with the
simplest of the two stories which I need to tell, namely, that
of act-state dependence without moral hazard. In fact, you
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